THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TENNESSEE ANTI-EVOLUTION ACT by WALLER, WILLIAM
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TENNESSEE
ANTI-EVOLUTION ACT
WILLIAM WALLER
The Tennessee General Assembly of 1925 enacted the most
widely discussed statute of recent years, popularly known as the
Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act:
"AN ACT prohibiting the teaching of the Evolution Theory in
all the Universities, Normals and all other public schools of Ten-
nesee, which are supported in whole or in part by the public school
funds of the State, and to provide penalties for the violations
thereof.
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the
State of Tenessee, That it shall be unlawful for any teacher in
any of the Universities, Normals and all other public schools of
the State which are supported in whole or in part by the public
school funds of the State, to teach any theory that denies the
story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and
to teach instead that man has descended from a lower order of
animals.
SECTION 2. Be it further enacted, That any teacher found
guilty of the violation of this Act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction, shall be fined not less than One Hundred
($100.00) Dollars nor more than Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars
for each offense.
SECTION 3. Be it further enacted, That this Act take effect
from and after its passage, the public welfare requiring it."
Mluch wonder has been expressed both in this country and in
Europe as to the factors which made such legislation possible.
These factors were three in number: (1) an aggressive campaign
by a militant minority of religious zealots of the "Fundamentalist!'
faith; (2) lack of knowledge of modern scientific and religious
thought in the rural districts which control Tennessee politically;
(3) political cowardice and demagogy.
The majority of the members of the legislature, including those
who voted for the bill, were sorry that the issue was raised. Once
raised, however, their training and background were such that
many of them honestly believed that a vote against the bill was a
vote against religion. Most of the affirmative votes were con-
scientiously cast. Other members who would have voted against
the bill had they voted conscientiously, were afraid that by so
doing they would lose the support of many of their fellow legis-
lators for other measures which they were sponsoring, and would
incur disfavor with the voters back home. They therefore yielded
to political expediency.
With the death of the great Fundamentalist leader, William
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Jennings Bryan, and the immense unfavorable publicity which
the Tennessee statute has received, the probability is that similar
laws will not be passed in other states. The Georgia legislature,
representing an electorate of much the same rural complexion as
Tennessee, last summer defeated such a measure by an over-
whelming vote.
The lawyer is interested in such legislation as the Tennessee
Anti-Evolution Act especially from the standpoint of its constitu-
tionality, and it is proposed to discuss this question.
The state has two bases of control over schools, which we may
denominate as "governmental" or "police power" control and
"proprietary" control. The first, applicable to all schools, public
and private, is expressed in the following paragraph of the opinion
of Mr. Justice McReynolds in the Oregon School Law case,' stating
what was not there involved:
"No question is raised concerning the power of the state reason-
ably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine
them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of
proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly
essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be
taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare."
Very much broader is the state's proprietary control over public
institutions, including the power to prescribe a curriculum, 2 to
select textbooks,3 to impose disciplinary regulations for students,4
and to exercise many other prerogatives of an owner and employer.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court held invalid a state
statute punishing a teacher in any school who should teach a for-
eign language to pupils who had not reached the eighth grade,
the ground of the decision being that the Fourteenth Amendment
was violated. As stated by Mr. Justice MlcReynolds, who de-
livered the opinion: "His right thus to teach and the right of
parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think; are
within the liberty of the Amendment."
If the Tennessee statute were not confined to public institutions
this decision would doubtless be controlling. In the present day
an enlightened and conscientious court would not hold that the
teaching of evolution is "manifestly inimical" to the public welfare.
As "police power" legislation it would be clearly invalid. But a
more difficult question is whether the statute may not be sustained
as an exercise of the state's proprietary control over public educa-
tional institutions.
'Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names (1925) 267 U. S. -, 45 Sup.
Ct. 571, 573.
2 See Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U. S. 390, 400, 43 Sup, Ct. 625, 628.
3Leeper v. State (1899) 103 Tenn. 500, 53 S. W. 962.
4 Waugh v. Mississippi University (1915) 237 U. S. 589, 35 Sup. Ct. 720.
5 Supra note 2.
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The statute could hardly be said to "prescribe a curriculum".
It does not abolish the teaching of certain scientific subjects and
thus save that expense to the state. On the other hand it assumes
that they are still to be taught. No change whatever is made
in any curriculum of any school. What the statute undertakes
to do is to set aside a scientific doctrine which would naturally
be taught as an integral and vital part of these subjects, and to
substitute a standard of truth of its own. The public schools,
state normal schools and state university are thus deprived of
their character of purely educational institutions, and are given
the r8le of protectors of a partisan belief or dogma.
The proponents of the statute look upon the state, however, as
having equally as broad control over public institutions of learn-
ing as the owner of a private school has over his establishment.
They urge the constitutionality of the Act upon the broad ground
that the taxpayers, through the legislature, may say what sort
of instruction their money shall provide, or to put it another way,
that the state, as the employer of the teacher, may direct his work
as it sees fit. If this view is correct-if no rule of reason is to
be applied-a protectionist majority in a legislative body may
say that the teacher of economics shall not expound the free trade
doctrine; a Roman Catholic majority may say that the teacher of
history shall teach nothing reflecting discredit upon any of the
Popes; or an especially mediaeval-minded legislature may pro-
vide that the teacher of geography shall teach nothing to conflict
with the Biblical cosmogony of a flat, four-cornered, stationary
earth and a sun and moon which move around it in a canopy-like
"firmament. Does our form of government permit such a "tyranny
of the majority" in matters affecting public education, or have the
minority rights which are constitutionally protected?
It is unquestionably true that a state government in its capacity
of paymaster has a degree of control over public employees and
institutions which it does not possess over private persons. But
to the doctrine that the majority, through the state government,
may control the disposition of public funds there is the well estab-
lished exception that these funds shall not be diverted to other
than "public purposes".0 Such a diversion would constitute a
taking of the property of the minority or dissenting taxpayers
without "due process of law". And, necessarily, the majority
are not the sole judges of what is a public purpose. In the courts
must rest the ultimate decision. Here, in the final analysis, must
be sought the solution of the present problem of the extent of a
state legislature's control over public education. While it is un-
thinkable that "academic freedom" should be permitted beyond
proper bounds (whatever they may be), it is equally unthinkable
6Fer el v. Doak (1925) 152 Tenn. -, 275 S. W. 29; Loani Acsocfrtion v
Topeka (1875, U. S.) 20 Wall. 655.
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that a state legislature should be permitted to dictate arbitrarily
upon matters which, after all, are best determined by specialists
in their peculiar field. The minority taxpayer, who contributes
to public education, may insist that the courts impose checks and
balances upon the legislature, just as the legislature, directly or
through subordinate boards and agencies, may and should impose
reasonable checks and balances upon the teacher. Abuse of dis-
cretion upon either side should not be countenanced.
Most of the cases discussing the proprietary control by a state
government and its agencies over public institutions and works,
and the limitations upon that control, involve regulations im-
posed upon contractors for public improvements in regard to their
laborers. The great weight of authority, including decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States, is that the state in its
proprietary capacity may lawfully require such contractors not
to work their laborers over eight hours a day,7 and to employ
only resident laborers.8  Neither a contractor nor a laborer may
complain of such a requirement. They need not work for the
state, and if they accept employment they must accept whatever
conditions are imposed. Neither may a taxpayer complain of
the increased cost of the improvement. There is a reasonable
argument to be made that regulations limiting the hours of labor
and excluding aliens from public employment are in furtherance
of a valid public policy-and with disputable questions of public
policy the courts have no concern. On the other hand, regulations
that only union labor shall be employed have uniformly been held
invalid as resulting in a taking of the taxpayers' property for a
"non-public purpose"., It is immaterial that the authors of such'
measures honestly believed that they were for the public good.
The courts must make the final decision and must measure pro-
prietary legislation, as they measure other legislation, by a rule
of reason. 0
7Atkin v. Kansas (1903) 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 24. See notes in 1
Ann. Cas. 46, and 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 131. The Federal government may
impose the same regulations as to Federal improvements. Ellis v. United
States (1907) 206 U. S. 246, 27 Sup. Ct. 600.
8 Heim v. McCall (1915) 239 U. S. 175, 36 Sup. Ct. 78. See Ann. Cas.
1915B 1271, note.
9 See 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 815, note.
20 There is, of course, one school of thought in the country, represented
upon the Supreme Court by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, which denies
the propriety of judicial interference, especially by the Federal Courts,
with any state legislation as denying "due process of law," except where
there is a procedural vice. If the state legislature make the bed, let the
people lie in it, and if the law is bad it will eventually be repealed. So
runs the argument, and much may be said in its favor. But the doctrine
has been settled the other way. Recognizing and accepting the mediocrity
and sometimes venality of our legislative bodies and their tendency to pass,
at times, arbitrary and capricious laws, we have evolved the judicial veto,
placed in the hands of men who are presumably of a higher order of intelli-
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These same principles are applicable to educational institutions.
Education is unquestionably a public purpose for which taxation
is lawful. The question to be determined, however, is whether
the same thing may be said of deliberately partisan instruction-
whether "education" is a public purpose when it is directed not
by the trend of scientific and scholastic development, and by the
consensus of opinion of specialists in education who have chosen
teaching as their profession, but by the beliefs of a majority of
the members of a legislative body.
If the legislature may expend public moneys in providing public
instruction in geology and biology according to a theological creed
rather than according to modern science, then it may establish a
state theological seminary for the promulgation of that creed. It
is immaterial that the Tennessee statute is negative in form and
provides merely that a certain scientific doctrine shall not be
taught instead of a certain theological dogma, without providing
afirmatively that the latter shall be taught. Propaganda of any
kind req(uires defense as well as offense-a shield as well as a
sword-and when the weakness of a dogma is its conflict with a
scientific theory, the suppression of that fact or theory in public
institutions of learning is equivalent to the use of public moneys
for the propagation of the dogma.
Is such a direction of teaching by the legislature a reasonable
exercise of its proprietary control over public schools and institu-
tions, involving merely a disputable question of public policy, or
is it so palpably arbitrary as to result in taxation for an unlawful
purpose? In considering this question let us inquire into the
public policy of the state of Tennessee as expressed in its
constitution.
Article 1, section 3 of the Constitution of 1870 provides:
"That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience;
that no man can of right, be compelled to attend, erect, or support
any place of worship, or to maintain any minister against his con-
sent; that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control
or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference
gence and political honesty. And so, while the cases contain many declara-
tions that a judge may not substitute his own ideas of public policy for the
judgment of the lawmaker, it is nevertheless apparent that the courts regard
the field of public policy as limited by what is, in the opinion of the judge,
reasonable. If the legislature reasonably differs from the court, the statute
is valid; if the legislature unreasonably and arbitrarily differs., the statute is
invalid. If a standard of reasonableness is to be employed by the courts
-here the legislation takes one form, it must for consistency's sake be em-
ployed where it takes another. If arbitrary "police power" laws are invalid,
how may the courts consistently evade the duty to declare arbitrary taxation
and arbitrary proprietary legislation likewise invalid-although, to be sure,
the domain of reasonableness may be broader as respects one form of legis-
lation than as respects the other?
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shall ever be given, by law, to any religious establishment or mode
of worship."
Article 1, section 4 provides:
"That no political or religious test, other than an oath to support
the constitution of the United States and of this state, shall ever
be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under
this state."
Article 11, section 12 provides:
"Knowledge, learning and virtue, being essential to the pre-
servation of republican institutions, and the diffusion of the oppor-
tunities and advantages of education throughout the different
portions of the state, being highly conducive to the promotion of
this end, it shall be the duty of the general assembly in all future
periods of this government, to cherish literature and science. And
the fund called the common school fund, and all the lands and
proceeds thereof, dividends, stocks, and other property of every
description whatever, heretofore by law appropriated by the gen-
eral assembly of this state for the use of common schools, and all
such as shall hereafter be appropriated, shall remain a perpetual
fund, the principal of which shall never be diminished by legis-
lative appropriations; and the interest thereof shall be inviolably
appropriated to the support and encouragement of common schools
throughout the state, and for the equal benefit of all the people
thereof; and no law shall be made authorizing said fund or any
part thereof to be diverted to any other use than the support and
encouragement of common schools. The state taxes, derived
hereafter from polls shall be appropriated to educational purposes,
in such manner as the general assembly shall from time to time
direct by law."
Bearing in mind that the evolution of man is a scientific doctrine,
and the Special Creation of man a theological doctrine, is it not
significant that the legislature is expressly directed to cherish
science, but that religion and theology are to be left entirely free
from governmental interference or aid? Is it not a fair conclusion
that where science and theology conflict, the legislature may not
give a preference to the latter by the use of moneys devoted by the
Constitution to educational purposes?
A number of state constitutions, especially in states where there
are strong religious minorities-a condition which tends to inject
religion into politics-contain express provigions that public aid
shall not be given in support of sectarian instruction or institu-
tions. 1 In Tennessee and other states the constitution framers
evidently regarded the principle of separation of church and state
as too fundamental and thoroughly accepted to call for a more
detailed consideration than the broad and general provisions above
quoted. The present division and antagonism in all sects between
Fundamentalists and Modernists-so violent as to lead one divi-
sion to seek legislative aid-could not well have been anticipated.
Even in the absence of express constitutional provision, however,
21 See 5 A. L. R. 866, 883, note.
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it seems clear that public moneys cannot be appropriated to the aid
of a sectarian school or to provide sectarian instruction, since such
an appropriation would seem not to be for a "public purpose".12
That the control of a state legislature over public institutions
of learning is limited by what is reasonable and not arbitrary or
capricious, is clearly implied in the opinion of the Supreme Court
in Wcugh v. Mississippi U iversity,3 holding valid as a rcasoz-
able disciplinary regulation a Mississippi statute prohibiting Greek
letter fraternities and other societies in the educational institutions
of the state. Speaking through Mr. Justice McKenna, the Court
said:
"It is to be remembered that the University was established by
the State and is under the control of the State, and the enactment
of the statute may have been induced by the opinion that member-
ship in the prohibited societies divided the attention of the students
and distracted from that singleness of purpose which the State
desired to exist in its public educational institutions. It is not for
us to entertain conjectures in opposition to the views of the State
and annul its regulations upon disputable considerations of their
wisdom or necessity."
It was further held that an exception , of "students already
entered" was not arbitrary but was "based on an obvious and
rational distinction"-viz., "an obvious principal of construction,
and sometimes of justice, that laws are not to be construed
retrospectively."
Within broad limits the legislature is undoubtedly the arbiter
of what is the public policy of the state, and of what is a "public
purpose"; and the courts may not properly interfere and sub-
stitute their own judgment. But when those limits are trans-
gressed, and a capricious legislature enacts a law by which public
moneys are expended for a purpose which clearly contravenes
those conceptions of public policy which are expressed in the State
Constitution, and especially such a fundamental principle as the
separation of church and state, are we to say that the hands of
the judiciary are still tied, and that the minority have no pro-
tection? It seems clear that a law which arbitrarily prescribes
that in public institutions of learning an important and well
established scientific doctrine shall be displaced in favor of a
theological dogma is unconstitutional and void upon the broad
ground that it results in taxation for a private purpose.
If this view is correct, the statute is invalid under the "due
process of law" clauses of both the State Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. It is true
that the Federal Supreme Court has gone far in accepting the
judgment of state courts as to the public purpose of state legisla-
12 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Cify of Atchise-n (1892) 47 Kan. 712,
28 Pac. 1000; 1 Cooley, TaxatioL (4th ed. 1924) see. 201.
1:, Supra note 4, at 596. See also 27 A. L. R. 1074, note.
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tive appropriations of money or exercises of the power of taxation,
on the ground that what is a public purpose may vary with differ-
ent local conditions with which the state courts are more familiar.
14
But so far as the Anti-Evolution Act is concerned, it is difficult
to c6nceive of any local Tennessee conditions which would not
apply in the entire country.
It may well be contended also that the Anti-Evolution Act is
invalid on the narrower ground that it conflicts with the provisions
of the State Constitution, hereinbefore quoted, and especially with
the clause that "no preference shall ever be given by 'law to any
religious establishment or mode of worship". Proponents of the
Act have suggested that if, under this clause, the Bible cannot be
taught in the public schools, by the same token nothing can be
taught which conflicts with the Bible, and that the statute is
simply carrying the constitutional provision into effect. This view
presupposes the untenable premise that evolution is a religious
or theological doctrine. This is of course untrue, although it is
evident that Biblical literalists have incorporated disbelief of
evolution into their theology. But to prohibit the teaching of a
scientific doctrine because it conflicts with a theological creed is
of course, as already'pointed 6ut, to give a preference by law to
that creed.
Narrowly construing the language of this constitutional pro-
vision it may be said that it prohibits a preference to a "religious
establishment", not to a creed. But to uphold the statute upon
such a ground would be to ignore what has been previously sug-
gested, that such a question as this could not well have been
anticipated by the framers of the Constitution, and hence that a
solution of the problem must be sought in the broad and general
principles which they announced. Furthermore, the Fundamen-
talists have already perfected interdenominational organizations
or "establishments". Horizontal and sectarian lines are fading
away in comparison with the vertical cleavage in all sects between
the adherents of a literal interpretation of the Bible-who regard
the Genesis accounts of the Special Creation of man as an essential
part of their religion-and those on the other hand who regard
the Bible as a book of religion and literature and not of history
or science, and therefore view these accounts as poetry or allegory.
The statute converts the public schools, state normals and state
university into protectors of the former division-into citadels of
a theological creed or dogma of a particular "religious establish-
ment"--and this in the very teeth of the constitutional mandate
that the general assembly shall cherish science.
From the standpoint of the teacher, as well as that of the tax-
payer, the constitutionality of the statute is open to serious
question. The "rights of conscience" of the teacher who believes
14 Green v. Frazier (1920) 253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499.
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in evolution are controlled through the requirement that in teach-
ing science he shall suppress one of its most important principles.
If it were possible as a practical matter to escape this difficulty
by filling the chairs of geology and biology in public institutions
of learning with scientists who literally believe the stories of
Adam and Eve and Noah's ark, the result would in effect be the
imposition of a new "test" for persons holding a "public trust".'1
Can the teacher complain upon Federal constitutional grounds?
In Meyer v. Nebraska,"" a teacher was indicted for teaching Ger-
man, contrary to a statute. The Supreme Court held that the
statute was arbitrary, infringed the teacher's liberty, and violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Tennessee statute is different
in that only public institutions are affected. The difficulty sug-
gests itself, however, that the state, while invoking its proprietary
authority as an employer and paymaster, has drawn upon its
governmental power ("police power") of defining and punishing
crimes. The two elements are distinct. Thus, a legislature may
delegate to a school board the proprietary functions of prescribing
a curriculum and making other proper regulations for public
schools; but it may not delegate the power to prescribe the pun-
ishment.Y1 Furthermore, there is no contractual element in the
present statute; it became applicable upon passage to teachers
already employed, as well as to those to be employed in the
future. 8 It would seem, therefore, that, being a criminal statute,
it is not to be measured by the standards of proprietary legisla-
tion; and certainly it is void if measured by any other.
It is quite likely, however, that the courts in passing upon the
constitutionality of the Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act will not
reach any of the questions hitherto discussed, but that the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court will declare it invalid as not complying
with Article 2, section 17 of the State Constitution, providing
that, "No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one
subject, that subject to be expressed in the title." Far more
Is Cf. State v. Bird (1913) 253 Mo. 569, 162 S. W. 119, holding that
the position of guardian of a minor is a "public trust."
16 Supra note 2.
1-7 Cf. State v. McNally (1896) 48 La. Ann. 1450, 21 So. 27.
1s The statutq is thus distinguishable from those involved in Lccpcr v.
State, supra note 3; Atkin v. Kansas, supra note 7; Ellis v. UnMtce State3,
supra note 7; Heim v. McCall, supra note 8; and others. A person
who has notice of the conditions of his employment when the contract
is made may be precluded from complaining. By violating the condi-
tions imposed upon him he becomes guilty of a breach of contract. But
a teacher who has been employed to teach science for a year and is directed
in the middle of the year to teach nothing -which conflicts with certain
religious beliefs--though an important part of the course which he was
employed to teach-is in a very different situation. In such a case the
employer is the one who, by imposing the conditions, is guilty of the breach
of contract.
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Tennessee statutes have been held unconstitutional under this than
under any other constitutional provision.1
The title or caption of the present statute indicates that it is
an act to prohibit the "teaching of the evolution theory" in public
educational institutions. The body of the Act, however, makes it
unlawful "to teach any theory that denies the story of the Divine
Creation of man as taught in the Bible and to teach instead that
man has descended from a lower order of animals". If this
language means anything at all, it means that the teaching of
evolution is not unlawful unless it is taught instead of the Bible
story. In other words, if the teacher, after explaining and ex.
pounding the evolution theory, also explains and expounds the
Bible story and tells the students to take their choice, he has not
violated the statute. To convict a teacher of a violation of the
statute the prosecution must prove not merely that the defendant
taught the evolution theory but that he taught it instead of the
Bible story,-that is to say, either that he ignored the latter
entirely, or that he taught the former as fact and the latter as
fiction. But of this essential element of the misdemeanor the
title of the Act gives no indication. The title fails to give suffi-
cient notice of the purpose, found in the body, to enact the Bible
story of the origin of man into a standard of truth for scientific
education.
It maybe thought that this is an incorrect and unduly narrow
construction of the statute. It is very obscurely worded and
it is possible that its authors had in mind something different
from its literal meaning. But a penal statute must be strictly
construed. Certainly, if we discard this construction, the statute
is void for uncertainty. A criminal statute must be definite in
meaning, so that one may know what he may and may not legally
do.2
0
These questions, however, are of minor importance. The ques-
tion in which lawyers and laymen alike are interested, and an
answer to which by the courts they will anxiously await, is
whether a state legislature has an unlimited control over what
shall and shall not be taught in schools and institutions of learning
supported by taxation, or whether the minority taxpayer may
insist that such control be reasonably exercised, and exercised
in the interests of education rather than theology.
19Ragio v. State (1888) 86 Tenn. 272, 6 S. W. 401; State v. Bradt (1899)
103 Tenn. 584, 53 S. W. 942; State v. Hayes (1906) 116 Tenn. 40, 93 S, W.
98; State 'v. Cumberland Club (1916) 136 Tenn. 84, 188 S. W. 583.
20 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co. (1921) 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Railroad and W. Commission (1922, D. C. D,
Minn.) 280 Fed. 387; Wabash Ry. v. O'Bryan (1922, E. D. Mo.) 285 Fed.
583..
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